Abstract: This study tests the hypothesis that hypothetical bias may not be related to value elicitation; rather it may be a value formation problem. When participants are asked to indicate their willingness to pay for an induced value good, we find no evidence of hypothetical bias for three different commodity types (public good, private good, and publicly provided private good). However, when these same subjects are asked to value homegrown goods with no pre-assigned induced value using the same elicitation mechanism, hypothetical values are roughly double actual payments in all three cases. These results support the hypothesis that the process of forming values in a homegrown setting may be a key contributor to hypothetical bias.
Introduction 1
Contingent valuation (CV) is one of the primary tools for estimating the value of non-market 2 goods. The methodology can play a key role in policy decisions that rely on benefit-cost 3 analysis, and as the Exxon Valdez case highlighted, CV can be instrumental in determining 4 penalties for environmental damages. Despite CV's prominent role, its use as a decision making 5 tool is often quite controversial. Because CV surveys are hypothetical in both the payment for 6 and provision of the good, it is impossible to determine whether the choices made in a 7 hypothetical survey are consistent with how the individual would behave if actually given an 8 opportunity to do so. This inconsequential nature of CV surveys, i.e., the lack of a salient 9 economic commitment, can lead to hypothetical bias in which CV overestimates the true 10 economic value of the good. persists, the general applicability of calibration techniques designed to offset these effects may 15 be limited. The cheap talk approach (Cummings and Taylor 1999) , for example, is a popular 16 calibration technique in which the hypothetical bias problem is described to subjects. Yet, the 17 effectiveness of this approach may be sensitive to key variables such as script length (Poe, et al. 18 2002; Aadland and Caplan 2003) , subject experience (List 2001; Lusk 2003 ; Aadland and 19 Caplan 2003) and payment amounts (Brown, et al. 2003; Murphy, et al. 2005b) . In fact, Aadland 20 and Caplan 2006 find that a neutral cheap talk script can actually exacerbate hypothetical bias. The vast majority of contingent valuation hypothetical bias experiments elicit subjective, 1 homegrown values, rather than experimenter-controlled, pre-assigned induced values. Unlike 2 induced values, the researcher cannot know these homegrown values with certainty. Because of 3 this, when researchers observe that values in a hypothetical payment scenario are higher than the 4 corresponding treatment with actual, consequential payments, it is impossible to know for sure 5 whether hypothetical values are overstated or actual values are understated (or possibly a 6 combination of the two). Researchers typically make the reasonable assumption that the 7 responses in the real settings accurately represent the true economic value, yet it is entirely 8 possible that the reverse is true. For example, when payments for public good provision are 9 consequential, responses could be biased downward due to factors like free-riding or the desire 10 to only pay one's fair share. In the case of private goods, both Harrison, et al. 2004 and Murphy 11 and Stevens 2004 hypothesize that responses to actual payment questions for private goods may 12 be censored by the market price. The linkage between value elicitation for public and private 13 goods is particularly important considering that many experimental studies of non-market 14 valuation techniques use private goods, and as with public goods, hypothetical bias is often 15 observed. 16 Much is known about the presence of hypothetical bias with homegrown goods, even 17 though the underlying causes are not fully understood. There is a recent increase in the use of 18 induced value experiments to shed light on the hypothetical bias observed when eliciting 19 homegrown values. In induced value experiments, the true underlying value is known and 20 therefore deviations from this value are more readily identified. In an induced value experiment 21 that uses a referendum for provision of a public good, Taylor, et al. 2001 find no evidence of 22 hypothetical bias in aggregate, even though they observe errors at the individual level. They 23 conclude that hypothetical bias is not a value elicitation problem, but rather that value formation 1 may be at the heart of hypothetical bias. Their conclusion is certainly reasonable, and dovetails 2 nicely with the literature about value uncertainty. 2 However, respondents misvoted-that is, 3 voted in a manner inconsistent with their induced values-over 16% of the time in both the real 4 and hypothetical payment treatments. It turns out that even though roughly one in six responses 5 was a "decision error," there was no hypothetical bias in aggregate. 6
Even in the absence of any hypothetical bias, it is still possible that the WTP estimates 7 could be inaccurate. This is precisely what Mitani and Flores (2009) 
Experimental Design 5
A total of 169 students were recruited from the general student population at the University of 6
Massachusetts, Amherst. Subjects were informed about the experiments through flyers that were 7 placed around campus and a recruiting table that was set up in the campus center. Subjects were 8 paid $5 for showing up on time and were told they would be given an opportunity to earn 9 additional money during an experiment that would last no more than 90-minutes (actual 10 experiment time was less than one hour). 11
Our 32 (type of good  payment type) experimental design is shown in Table 1 . Each of 12 the six cells represents a unique treatment. Each subject participated in only one of the six 13 treatments. The data were collected on six separate days, one treatment each day. The three rows 14 indicate the three good types (private, publicly-provided private, or public). As shown in Table  15 1, the switch from a private to public good context entails changes to both the good used to elicit 16 homegrown values and the elicitation mechanism. To control for potential confounding effects, 17
we also included a publicly-provided private good as an intermediate step between the two good 18 types. The payment type columns reflect the two payment conditions (real or hypothetical). The 19 real and hypothetical treatments differed only in that outcomes in the former were consequential, 20 whereas in the latter subjects received a pre-announced fixed payment regardless of the 21 experiment results. The instructions in the hypothetical payment treatments were modified 22 slightly to reflect the inconsequential nature of the payments. Subjects in these hypothetical 23 treatments were told: "Each of you will receive exactly $13.50 at the end of the experiment today 1 (in addition to the $5 you already received for participating), regardless of your decisions and the 2 outcomes... Although your earnings in today's experiment are fixed at $13.50, we ask you to 3 suppose that your earnings were based on your decisions and the auction outcomes..." The 4 $13.50 fixed earnings in the hypothetical payment treatments equal the expected earnings in the 5 real payment treatments. 3 
6
In each of the six treatments in Table 1 , subjects participated in a total of five rounds. In 7 each round of a particular treatment, the type of good, payment type and elicitation mechanism 8 remained constant; the only factor that varied across the five rounds for a particular subject was 9 whether induced or homegrown values were elicited. As shown in Table 2 , the first two rounds 10 were practice rounds using induced values to familiarize subjects with the instructions and the 11 elicitation mechanism. 4 After both practice rounds were completed, the transaction prices for 12 each practice round were determined and results announced. The results from the practice 13 rounds did not count towards an individual's earnings and are not included in the data. After 14 completion of the two practice rounds (P1 and P2), stage 1 (rounds 1 and 2) was introduced. 15
Like the practice rounds, stage 1 also used induced values. Stage 2 (round 3) followed the same 16 procedures as the previous rounds with the exception that induced values were no longer used. 17
Instead, homegrown values for a specific good (coffee mug or a contribution to Heifer 18 International) were elicited. 19 3 It turns out that the additional earnings in the real payment treatments were higher, averaging $17.43 (=2.78). This difference between actual and expected earnings is due to the transaction prices that were randomly selected using a BDM-style elicitation mechanism described shortly.
Hence, for each subject, we have three WTP observations (two induced values from stage 1 one, and one homegrown value from stage two), all of which were elicited in same manner under 2 the same payment condition (i.e., real or hypothetical). This design allows us to make within-3 subject comparisons of outcomes in induced vs. homegrown values settings while holding the 4 payment condition and good type constant, and between-subject tests for hypothetical bias 5 holding constant the type of good and value type (i.e., induced or homegrown). 6
Private good. In the two private good treatments (one each for real and hypothetical 7 payment), values were elicited using a slightly modified version of the Becker-DeGroot-8
Marschak (BDM) mechanism (Becker et al. 1964) . 5 For both the induced value (stage one) and 9 homegrown value (stage two) elicitation, subjects received a purchase offer slip that contained 10 each of the 15 possible prices, ranging between $1 and $15 in whole dollar increments. Table 3  11 shows an example of the purchase offer slip for a subject with an induced value of $4.50 in the 12 private good real payment treatment. For each of these possible prices, subjects indicated 13 whether they were willing to make a purchase at that price. Bids had to be consistent in that if 14 they indicated "yes" to a particular price, then they had to indicate yes to all lower prices. With 15 this payment card approach, an individual's maximum WTP lies between the highest value to 16 which she indicated "yes" and the next highest amount. The transaction price was determined by 17 randomly selecting a marble from a basket containing 15 marbles numbered 1 through 15; the 18 number on the marble was the price. If the participant indicated "yes" to making a purchase at 19 5 Horowitz (2006) shows that the BDM is not theoretically incentive compatible for some behavioral models which are outside an expected utility framework. The empirical results are mixed. Both Irwin et al. (1998) and Vossler and McKee (2006) provide experimental evidence supporting the demand revealing properties of the BDM, and Plott and Zeiler (2005) cite the BDM's incentive compatibility, particular with subjects who are trained in a mechanism which might otherwise be unfamiliar. On the other hand, Noussair et al. (2004) find that the second-price auction is a more effective at eliciting willingness-to-pay than the BDM. Lusk and Rousu (2006) also found that the second-price and random nth price auctions are more accurate than the BDM on average. the randomly selected price, then a transaction occurred at that price. Earnings were the 1 difference between the induced value of the token and the transaction price. If the participant 2 indicated "no" for the selected price, then no transaction occurred and earnings were zero. This 3 process was repeated for each participant. 4
The first stage used induced values and consisted of two separate individual decision 5 tasks using tokens with pre-assigned values. Before the stage one tasks, all subjects were told 6 they had $10 in an initial cash balance and that any earnings would be added to this. All subjects 7
had an induced value of $4.50 in the first round and $11.50 in the second. These values were 8 private information and subjects were told to make no assumptions about the others' token 9
values. Assuming truthful demand revelation, expected earnings in the first round are $0.53 and 10 $4.03 in the second. 11
The second stage (round 3) elicited homegrown values. Each subject was presented with 12 an opportunity to purchase one 16-ounce stainless steel travel coffee mug with the logo of a 13 popular on-campus student-run coffee shop. The mug was described as follows: 14
We will sell these 16-ounce stainless steel travel mugs from People's Market, which I will now Other than the change from induced values to homegrown values, the second stage proceeded in 23 exactly the same manner as the first. After the second stage was completed, all three prices (two 24 for stage one, and another for the second stage) were determined using the BDM mechanism. 25 6 The no-refund policy removes the possibility of purchasing the mug with the sole intent of returning it for the $10 retail price.
Outcomes were announced at the end of the experiment to avoid the possibility that later 1 decisions could be conditioned on prior results. 2 Public good. In the two public good treatments, values were elicited through a BDM-3 style referendum that was modified to parallel the mechanism used for private goods as closely 4 as possible (Vossler and McKee, 2006) . Subjects received a voting slip similar to the purchase 5 offer slip in Table 3 . For each of the 15 possible "project costs," subjects had to indicate how 6 they would vote in a referendum that required all participants to pay this amount, and as with the 7 BDM, votes had to be consistent. The project cost was determined by randomly selecting a 8 marble from a basket containing 15 marbles numbered 1 through 15; the number on the marble 9 was the cost. After determining the cost, we tallied the votes for that cost. If more than half the 10 subjects voted yes to the randomly selected cost, then the project was implemented and each 11 subject paid that amount. 12
The first stage used induced values and was presented as a pair of group projects from 13 which each participant received some pre-assigned benefit. The initial cash and induced values 14 were the same as the private good BDM. In the second stage (with homegrown values), the 15 induced values were replaced with a referendum on whether the group would make a 16 contribution to Heifer International to purchase a flock of chickens for needy families. Subjects 17 were given promotional materials from Heifer International, and the referendum was described 
4
Publicly-provided private good. Although careful attention was paid to make the public 5 and private good treatments as similar as possible, they differ in two important dimensions: the 6 elicitation mechanism (BDM vs. referendum) and the stage two good (coffee mug vs. Heifer 7 International). In the second stage, a vote in support of a group contribution to Heifer 8
International imposes costs on all group members and also provides a public good. The decision 9 to purchase a mug, however, is a private transaction that does not impose a cost on other group 10 members and the benefits also accrue only to the individual. To determine whether any 11 differences in behavior between the public and private good contexts are attributable to the 12 elicitation mechanism or the good itself, we also conducted a pair of publicly-provided private 13 good treatments. 14 The first stage was the same as that for the public good with a slightly different frame. 15
Subjects were asked to vote in a referendum (public provision) to determine whether everyone in 16 the group would buy a token (private good) at a randomly selected price. The pair of induced 17 values was the same as the other two treatments. In the second stage, subjects were asked to vote 18 in a referendum to determine whether everyone would buy a coffee mug. If a majority of 19 subjects voted yes to a randomly selected price, then each person would have to buy a mug 20 regardless of how she voted. 21 
Results 23
Induced values. We begin using the stage one results to test whether hypothetical bias exists 24 with induced values. Because bids were constrained to whole dollar increments, a demand-25 revealing individual with an induced value of $4.50 would indicate a maximum WTP of $4.00. 1
Similarly, when induced values are $11.50, the maximum WTP should be $11.00. Indeed, the 2 median WTP in both the real and hypothetical treatments conform to predictions for all three 3 good types and both payment amounts. Table 4 that this between-subject difference is not significant for either the private or public goods. 7 For 7 the publicly-provided private good, the difference is weakly significant (p=0.08); this result Another measure for comparing bidding behavior between real and hypothetical payment 20 conditions is the mean absolute deviation (MAD) of the observed bid from the induced value 21 (Table 5 ). The MAD for subjects who fully reveals demand would be $0.50 (resulting from a 22 $4.00 bid with a $4.50 induced value or an $11.00 bid with an $11.50 induced value). Note that 1 with this approach, a bid that incurs a $0.50 loss is treated identical to a demand revealing bid. 2 Using this metric, there is no statistically significant difference between real and hypothetical 3 bids for any of the comparisons in Table 5 . 4 An advantage of the induced value experiments is that we can observe whether behavior 5 is consistent with these values, whereas with homegrown values we must assume that behavior 6 in the real payment treatments reflects the individual's true WTP. With the stage one induced 7 value data, we can identify misvotes or decision errors, i.e., those instances in which individuals 8
are not behaving in a manner consistent with truthful demand revelation. In the private good 9 treatments, Table 6 shows that were no misvotes in the real payment condition-which leaves 10 little doubt that subjects fully understood the instructions, the elicitation mechanism and how to 11 accurately state their values. Similarly, with hypothetical payments, only 3 of 56 subjects (5%) 12 misvoted and a Fisher exact test indicates that there is no statistically significant difference 13 (p=0.25) between misvotes in these hypothetical and real treatments. 14 This result of near-perfect bidding behavior using a BDM to elicit values for a private 15 good provides strong support for the demand revealing properties of the mechanism. With real 16 payments, Irwin et al. (1998) found that 62% of their BDM bids were optimal, and there was no good, but they use a standard second-price auction not a BDM. 8 When averaged over the course 21 of 10 rounds, they do observe hypothetical bias: hypothetical bids are 38.5% higher than real 22 8 Shogren et al. (2001) note that second price auctions are accurate in aggregate, but are susceptible to insincere bidding by off-margin traders. bids on average. Much of this is attributable to inflated hypothetical bids in later rounds, possibly 1 due to boredom. Their first two rounds represent a closer parallel with our experimental design. 2 Somewhat surprisingly, they report substantial underbidding in both real and payment conditions 3 for the first two rounds. Although real bids were 12.8% higher than hypothetical bids, as in our 4 study this difference was not statistically significant. 9 
5
When we introduced the referendum, however, the rate of misvotes increased. In our 6 public good referendum, we observe 19% and 12% misvotes in the real and hypothetical 7 treatments, respectively, and a Fisher exact test indicates that there is no statistically significant 8 difference between these (p=0.44). This result is consistent with those of Taylor et al. who 9 observe about a 16% misvote rate in both treatments. In the publicly-provided private good 10 treatment, hypothetical misvotes (34%) are significantly higher than in the real payment scenario 11 (12%). Much of this difference in the rate of misvotes between the real and hypothetical payment 12 scenarios is due to subjects voting yes to hypothetical outcomes that would yield a $0.50 loss. 13
Both Taylor et al. and Vossler and McKee suggest that such small losses may not be salient; 14 using a "loose" definition of misvotes (which does not classify a vote leading to a 50 cent loss as 15 misvote) we find that the difference between real and hypothetical payments for the publicly 16 provided private good is much smaller and only weakly significant (p=0.10). As in Taylor et al., 17 we find that although there are some misvotes at the individual level, those who overbid and 18 underbid tend to cancel each other out so aggregate results are approximately demand revealing 19 with both the real and hypothetical payments. However, this also raises questions about the 20 conditions under which these voting errors in a referendum might be asymmetric, possibly 21 leading to a bias in some referenda. 22 9 Thanks to Todd Cherry for sharing their data.
We find it particularly noteworthy that bidding behavior with private goods is near-1 perfect, but when the BDM-style referendum is introduced some misvoting occurs. This raises 2 the question as to why misvoting arises more frequently with a group decision via referenda than 3 with a purely private transaction. Our design does not permit a testing of possible causes for this 4 outcome and we can only provide some conjectures about this. We note the rate of misvotes 5 observed is consistent with that reported by both Taylor we cannot rule out the possibility that misvotes in the referendum are due to confusion or 7 misunderstanding, we feel that this is unlikely, particularly in light of the near-perfect outcomes 8 with the private good BDM mechanism which was structured to be as close as possible to the 9 BDM-style referendum we used. More likely, these misvotes are not random errors, but rather 10 indicate that a referendum is highly demand revealing, but not perfectly so. Vossler and McKee 11 suggest that some misvoting could be due to other-regarding behavior, in particular a willingness 12 to incur a small loss if it is in the best interest of the group. They conclude that this effect is 13 likely to be small and we tend to agree. Without information about the distribution of others ' 14 induced values, subjects have no way of knowing what is in the group interest. Another possible 15 explanation is a misguided attempt at strategic behavior or coordination. The private good BDM 16 is a purely individual decision making exercise with no potential for strategic interactions or 17 other-regarding behavior. However, the referendum does entail a group decision and subjects 18 could conceivably make errors in recognizing that this mechanism is also incentive compatible. 19
Homegrown values. Whereas we observe no hypothetical bias with induced values, when 20
we elicit homegrown values this bias does emerge. The bottom of Table 4 shows that 21 hypothetical bias is present for all three types of good. Median WTP is $3 to $4 higher in the 22 three hypothetical payment treatments than their real payment counterparts, and these differences 23 are statistically significant. Thus, the same subjects who exhibited no hypothetical bias in stage 1 one with induced values, do exhibit hypothetical bias when asked to value a specific good in 2 stage two. These results clearly support Taylor et al.'s conjecture that hypothetical bias is not a 3 value elicitation problem in aggregate, but rather a value formation problem. 4
An unexpected result with the homegrown values is the higher willingness-to-pay for the 5 exact same coffee mug in the private good treatment when compared to the publicly-provided 6
context. The main difference between the two is the elicitation procedure: individual purchase 7 via an individual decision task versus a referendum requiring all group members to buy a mug. 8
The difference is significant for real payments (p=0.08), but not with hypothetical payments 9 (p=0.22). If anything, we anticipated a lower willingness-to-pay in the referendum because 10 participants might be reluctant to require others to involuntarily purchase a private good. these are the notion of paying ones' fair share, consideration of previous charitable contributions, 23 and a concern for "how the world should be", all largely detached from the context of money. 1 But, when asked to make actual payment, respondents appear to focus on monetary 2 considerations, and this can give rise to hypothetical bias. 3
Of course, in homegrown situations many other factors, like free riding, may contribute 4 to this problem. And, in some cases, hypothetical bias may even be seen as a general cognitive 5 response; people like to think of themselves as being generous and this is costless when payment 6 is not required. Even our everyday speech hints at hypothetical bias-"actions speak louder than 7 words," "practice what you preach", and the "road to hell is paved with good intentions." 8
To better understand and to correct for hypothetical bias, a necessary first step is to be 9 able to turn it off and on in the laboratory which is the major contribution of this paper. We 10 observe that hypothetical bias at the aggregate level emerges during the process of homegrown 11 value formation for private, publicly-provided private, and public goods. The presence of 12 individual decision errors in our referenda using induced values, but not in the BDM, suggests 13 that although value formation is a major factor in hypothetical bias, the elicitation mechanism 14 may also play a secondary role, at least at the individual level. 15 16 
